Begging the Question Against A Peer?

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Abstract

A dialectical conception of justification helps conciliationists about peer disagreement establish the symmetry considerations on which their account is premised. On this conception, appeals to personal or hidden forms of evidence fail to provide a symmetry breaker that would allow one to dismiss a conflicting peer opinion. Furthermore, the act of citing the same evidence repetitively tends to illegitimately beg the question against the peer, no matter how accurate one’s own overall assessment of this evidence. However, the dialectical conception of justification does not automatically vindicate conciliationism. In many of the most interesting cases of peer disagreement there are vast bodies of dialectically sharable evidence that can ultimately provide enough non-question-begging epistemic resources to settle the dispute, even if appealing to those resources violates the independence requirement—a further premise of conciliationism. Absent modifications to the independence requirement, it would therefore be premature to embrace conciliationism.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of Philosophical Research
Volume46
Pages (from-to)307-327
Number of pages21
ISSN1053-8364
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 25 Aug 2021
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy
  • Analytical epistemology
  • Social epistemology
  • Philosophy of social science

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