Believing in Expressivism

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

Abstract

I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Metaethics
EditorsRuss Shafer-Landau
Number of pages11
Volume8
Place of PublicationOxford
PublisherOxford University Press
Publication date2013
Pages252-282
ISBN (Print)978-0-19-967804-4
Publication statusPublished - 2013
MoE publication typeA3 Book chapter

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy

Cite this