Abstract
I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Oxford Studies in Metaethics |
Editors | Russ Shafer-Landau |
Number of pages | 11 |
Volume | 8 |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Publication date | 2013 |
Pages | 252-282 |
ISBN (Print) | 978-0-19-967804-4 |
Publication status | Published - 2013 |
MoE publication type | A3 Book chapter |
Fields of Science
- 611 Philosophy