Believing in Expressivism

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

    Abstract

    I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationOxford Studies in Metaethics
    EditorsRuss Shafer-Landau
    Number of pages11
    Volume8
    Place of PublicationOxford
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Publication date2013
    Pages252-282
    ISBN (Print)978-0-19-967804-4
    Publication statusPublished - 2013
    MoE publication typeA3 Book chapter

    Fields of Science

    • 611 Philosophy

    Cite this

    Toppinen, T. M. M. (2013). Believing in Expressivism. In R. Shafer-Landau (Ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Vol. 8, pp. 252-282). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Toppinen, Teemu Mauno Matias. / Believing in Expressivism. Oxford Studies in Metaethics. editor / Russ Shafer-Landau. Vol. 8 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. pp. 252-282
    @inbook{98b6afaa112e4264a633ea94cbc83561,
    title = "Believing in Expressivism",
    abstract = "I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).",
    keywords = "611 Philosophy",
    author = "Toppinen, {Teemu Mauno Matias}",
    year = "2013",
    language = "English",
    isbn = "978-0-19-967804-4",
    volume = "8",
    pages = "252--282",
    editor = "Russ Shafer-Landau",
    booktitle = "Oxford Studies in Metaethics",
    publisher = "Oxford University Press",
    address = "United Kingdom",

    }

    Toppinen, TMM 2013, Believing in Expressivism. in R Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. vol. 8, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 252-282.

    Believing in Expressivism. / Toppinen, Teemu Mauno Matias.

    Oxford Studies in Metaethics. ed. / Russ Shafer-Landau. Vol. 8 Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2013. p. 252-282.

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

    TY - CHAP

    T1 - Believing in Expressivism

    AU - Toppinen, Teemu Mauno Matias

    PY - 2013

    Y1 - 2013

    N2 - I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).

    AB - I outline an expressivist account of the meaning of normative sentences, according to which normative sentences express higher-order states of being in certain kinds of complex states con-sisting of both desire-like states (or 'pro-attitudes') and non-normative beliefs. Having first introduced this kind of higher-order state view (section 1), I argue that it can exploit the resources that ecumenical expressivism is sometimes supposed to have for dealing with the Frege-Geach problem (section 2), and yet avoid the problems with the ecumenical view regarding validity, expression relation, and disagreement (sections 3, 4, and 5).

    KW - 611 Philosophy

    M3 - Chapter

    SN - 978-0-19-967804-4

    VL - 8

    SP - 252

    EP - 282

    BT - Oxford Studies in Metaethics

    A2 - Shafer-Landau, Russ

    PB - Oxford University Press

    CY - Oxford

    ER -

    Toppinen TMM. Believing in Expressivism. In Shafer-Landau R, editor, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 8. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2013. p. 252-282