Does the interventionist notion of causation deliver us from the fear of epiphenomenalism?

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    Abstract

    This article reviews the causal exclusion argument and confronts it with some recently proposed refutations based on the interventionist account of causation. I first show that there are several technical and interpretative difficulties in applying the interventionist account to the exclusion issue. Different ways of accommodating the two to one another are considered and all are shown to leave the issue without a fully satisfactory resolution. Lastly, I argue that, on the most consistent construal, the interventionist approach can provide grounds for thinking that higher-level causal notions are as legitimate as lower-level causal notions, but it does not provide grounds for postulating inter-level causal interactions.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalInternational Studies in the Philosophy of Science
    Volume27
    Issue number2
    Pages (from-to)157-172
    Number of pages16
    ISSN0269-8595
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2013
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

    Fields of Science

    • 119 Other natural sciences

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