Epistemological scientism and the scientific meta‐method

Petri Niklas Turunen, Ilmari Hirvonen, Ilkka Orjo Tapani Pättiniemi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review


This paper argues that the proponents of epistemological scientism must take some stand on scientific methodology. The supporters of scientism cannot simply defer to the social organisation of science because the social processes themselves must meet some methodological criteria. Among such criteria is epistemic evaluability, which demands intersubjective access to reasons. We derive twelve theses outlining some implications of epistemic evaluability. Evaluability can support weak and broad variants of epistemological scientism, which state that sciences, broadly construed, are the best sources of knowledge or some other epistemic goods. Since humanities and social sciences produce epistemically evaluable results, narrow types of scientism that take only natural sciences as sources of knowledge require additional argumentation in their support. Strong scientism, which takes sciences as the only source of knowledge, also needs to appeal to some further principles since evaluability is not an all-or-nothing affair.
Translated title of the contributionEpistemologinen skientismi ja tieteen metamenetelmä
Original languageEnglish
JournalEuropean Journal for Philosophy of Science
Issue number2
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - 8 Jun 2023
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed
EventEuropean Philosophy of Science Association biannual meeting 2021 - Turin, Italy
Duration: 15 Sep 202118 Sep 2021

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy
  • Demarcation
  • Epistemic access
  • Epistemic evaluability
  • Institutional epistemology
  • Scientific methodology
  • Scientism
  • Social epistemology

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