Explanation by Idealized Theories

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

The use of idealized scientific theories in explanations of empirical facts and regularities is problematic in two ways: they don't satisfy the condition that the explanans is true, and they may fail to entail the explanandum. An attempt to deal with the latter problem was proposed by Hempel and Popper with their notion of approximate explanation. A more systematic perspective on idealized explanations was developed with the method of idealization and concretization by the Poznan school (Nowak, Krajewski) in the 1970s. If idealizational laws are treated as counterfactual conditionals, they can be true or truthlike, and the concretizations of such laws may increase their degree of truthlikeness. By replacing Hempel's truth requirement with the condition that an explanatory theory is truthlike one can distinguish several important types of approximate, corrective, and contrastive explanations by idealized theories. The conclusions have important consequences for the debates about scientific realism and anti-realism.

Original languageEnglish
JournalKairos
Volume20
Issue number1
Pages (from-to)43-63
Number of pages21
ISSN1521-2300
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed
EventLisbon ICPOS: Contemporary Issues - The Center for Philosophy of Science (CFCUL), Lissabon, Portugal
Duration: 14 Dec 201616 Dec 2016
Conference number: 3

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy
  • Philosophy of Science

Cite this

Niiniluoto, Ilkka. / Explanation by Idealized Theories. In: Kairos. 2018 ; Vol. 20, No. 1. pp. 43-63.
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Explanation by Idealized Theories. / Niiniluoto, Ilkka.

In: Kairos, Vol. 20, No. 1, 06.2018, p. 43-63.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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