Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Gottlob Frege did not call any of his philosophical views by the name “ontology”, let alone “metaontology”. When applied to Frege’s thought, the term “metaontology” is clearly anachronistic. Still, this paper discusses two philosophical positions that Frege held and that have metaontological relevance. They are the doctrine of the ambiguity of the word “is” and the doctrine of three realms. It is well known that Frege regarded existence as a second-order concept. Likewise, Frege’s distinction between three realms has been studied in detail. However, the relation between the two doctrines has not been clarified in detail; instead, they are studied as separate themes that occur in Frege’s writings. It is true Frege does not combine the two topics. This paper seeks to show that the two doctrines are connected in an interesting way: The concept of existence that is expressed as a second-order concept in the formula language plays an important logical role, while the doctrine of three realms is a means to express a division between three modes of being or three ways to exist. It seeks to show that the modes of being are predicated of objects, but they have a special, constitutive role in relation to those entities of which they are predicated. The word “exist” is thus an analogous rather than a completely ambiguous word. The paper suggests that Frege's views on of “being” and being contain elements both of Aristotelian and of Kantian approaches to metaphysics.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationMetametaphysics and the Sciences : Historical and Philosophical Perspectives
EditorsFrode Kjosavik, Camilla Serck-Hanssen
Place of PublicationNew York
PublisherRoutledge
Publication date2020
Pages81 - 98
Publication statusPublished - 2020
MoE publication typeA3 Book chapter

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy
  • ontology
  • metaphysics
  • logic

Cite this

Haaparanta, L. T. (2020). Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology. In F. Kjosavik, & C. Serck-Hanssen (Eds.), Metametaphysics and the Sciences: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (pp. 81 - 98). New York: Routledge.
Haaparanta, Leila Tuulikki. / Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology. Metametaphysics and the Sciences: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. editor / Frode Kjosavik ; Camilla Serck-Hanssen. New York : Routledge, 2020. pp. 81 - 98
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Haaparanta, LT 2020, Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology. in F Kjosavik & C Serck-Hanssen (eds), Metametaphysics and the Sciences: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge, New York, pp. 81 - 98.

Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology. / Haaparanta, Leila Tuulikki.

Metametaphysics and the Sciences: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. ed. / Frode Kjosavik; Camilla Serck-Hanssen. New York : Routledge, 2020. p. 81 - 98.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

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Haaparanta LT. Frege on "Es gibt," Being in a Realm and (Meta-)Ontology. In Kjosavik F, Serck-Hanssen C, editors, Metametaphysics and the Sciences: Historical and Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Routledge. 2020. p. 81 - 98