From ideals to deals

the effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior

Marja-Liisa Halko, Topi Olli Oskari Miettinen

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

In this paper, we study a two-party pie-sharing problem in the presence of asymmetries in the stakeholders' private endowments. Both the two stakeholders and third-party arbitrators may influence the outcome. We consider Nash-demand negotiations, where the two stakeholders place demands and share the pie accordingly if demands are compatible, and elicit dictatorial allocations from the stakeholders and the arbitrators. The Nash demands by stakeholders are strategic; the dictatorial allocations by stakeholders and arbitrators are non-strategic. We are interested in the influence of the past arbitrator experience on stakeholder allocations and demands and the past stakeholder experience on third-party arbitration allocations. We find that the ex-arbitrators' stakeholder allocations differ more from the impartial ideal than the stakeholder allocations by those without arbitration experience. In contrast with previous findings, the arbitration outcomes do not depend on the asymmetries in the previous stakeholder roles.
Original languageEnglish
Article number0182263
JournalPLoS One
Volume12
Issue number8
Number of pages16
ISSN1932-6203
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 17 Aug 2017
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Fields of Science

  • 511 Economics

Cite this

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From ideals to deals : the effect of impartiality experience on stakeholder behavior. / Halko, Marja-Liisa; Miettinen, Topi Olli Oskari.

In: PLoS One, Vol. 12, No. 8, 0182263 , 17.08.2017.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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