Is knowledge a natural kind?

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    Abstract

    The project of treating knowledge as an empirical object of study has gained popularity in recent naturalistic epistemology. It is argued here that the assumption that such an object of study exists is in tension with other central elements of naturalistic philosophy. Two hypotheses are considered. In the first, “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the relational character of truth creates a problem. In the second hypothesis “knowledge” is hypothesized to refer to mental states causally responsible for the evolutionarily successful behaviour of cognitive agents. Here, the problem lies in the fact that evolution by natural selection is not necessarily conducive to truth. The result does not necessarily amount to eliminativism, however, since the naturalist may consistently reject the condition of truth that lies behind these problems.
    Original languageEnglish
    JournalPhilosophical Studies : an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition
    Volume142
    Issue number3
    Pages (from-to)371-386
    Number of pages16
    ISSN0031-8116
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009
    MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

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