Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility.
Original languageEnglish
JournalThe Monist
Volume102
Issue number2
Pages (from-to)259–275
Number of pages17
ISSN0026-9662
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2019
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Fields of Science

  • 611 Philosophy

Cite this

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Moral Responsibility of Robots and Hybrid Agents. / Hakli, Raul Aleksi; Mäkelä, Pekka Antero.

In: The Monist, Vol. 102, No. 2, 04.2019, p. 259–275.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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AB - We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility.

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