One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve

Fernando Losada Fraga

One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve

Faculty of Law

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific

Abstract

This paper discusses the merits of the theory of constitutional synthesis as a
constitutional theory for a democratic European Union. The theory has been
developed by John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez in The Constitution’s
Gift (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).

The key component of the theory is the regulative ideal of a common constitutional
law, of a constitution composed of a collection of national constitutions,
which makes up the deep constitution of the European Union. Constitutional
synthesis is comprised of normative integration and institutional consolidation
which together constitute a distinct constitutional dynamic.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	A Multitude of Constitutions? : European Constitutional Pluralism in Question
Editors	John Erik Fossum, Agustín José Menéndez
Number of pages	6
Place of Publication	Oslo
Publisher	Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo
Publication date	2012
Pages	83-89
ISBN (Print)	978-82-93137-41-2
ISBN (Electronic)	978-82-93137-91-7
Publication status	Published - 2012
MoE publication type	B2 Book chapter

Publication series

Name	ARENA Report Series
Publisher	Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo
Number	No 4/12
ISSN (Print)	0807-3139
ISSN (Electronic)	1504-8152

Name	RECON Report Series
Publisher	Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo
Number	No 20
ISSN (Print)	1504-7253
ISSN (Electronic)	1504-7261

Fields of Science

513 Law
European Union
Democracy
Constitutional pluralism

Access to Document

http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECONreport2012.pdf?fileitem=4472961

Cite this

Losada Fraga, F. (2012). One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve. In J. E. Fossum, & A. J. Menéndez (Eds.), A Multitude of Constitutions?: European Constitutional Pluralism in Question (pp. 83-89). (ARENA Report Series; No. No 4/12), (RECON Report Series; No. No 20). Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECONreport2012.pdf?fileitem=4472961

Losada Fraga, Fernando. / One in a Million : Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve. A Multitude of Constitutions?: European Constitutional Pluralism in Question. editor / John Erik Fossum ; Agustín José Menéndez. Oslo : Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2012. pp. 83-89 (ARENA Report Series; No 4/12). (RECON Report Series; No 20).

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author = "{Losada Fraga}, Fernando",

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publisher = "Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo",

number = "No 4/12",

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Losada Fraga, F 2012, One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve. in JE Fossum & AJ Menéndez (eds), A Multitude of Constitutions?: European Constitutional Pluralism in Question. ARENA Report Series, no. No 4/12, RECON Report Series, no. No 20, Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, Oslo, pp. 83-89. <http://www.reconproject.eu/main.php/RECONreport2012.pdf?fileitem=4472961>

One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve. / Losada Fraga, Fernando.
A Multitude of Constitutions?: European Constitutional Pluralism in Question. ed. / John Erik Fossum; Agustín José Menéndez. Oslo: Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo, 2012. p. 83-89 (ARENA Report Series; No. No 4/12), (RECON Report Series; No. No 20).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific

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AB - This paper discusses the merits of the theory of constitutional synthesis as aconstitutional theory for a democratic European Union. The theory has beendeveloped by John Erik Fossum and Agustín José Menéndez in The Constitution’sGift (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).The key component of the theory is the regulative ideal of a common constitutionallaw, of a constitution composed of a collection of national constitutions,which makes up the deep constitution of the European Union. Constitutionalsynthesis is comprised of normative integration and institutional consolidationwhich together constitute a distinct constitutional dynamic.

KW - 513 Law

KW - European Union

KW - Democracy

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SP - 83

EP - 89

BT - A Multitude of Constitutions?

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Losada Fraga F. One in a Million: Why constitutional synthesis is as normatively viable as extremely difficult to achieve. In Fossum JE, Menéndez AJ, editors, A Multitude of Constitutions?: European Constitutional Pluralism in Question. Oslo: Arena -Centre for European Studies, University of Oslo. 2012. p. 83-89. (ARENA Report Series; No 4/12). (RECON Report Series; No 20).