The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socio-economic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs discovered these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-à-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?
Original languageEnglish
JournalPost-Soviet Affairs
Volume32
Issue number5
Pages (from-to)455-473
Number of pages19
ISSN1060-586X
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Aug 2015
MoE publication typeA1 Journal article-refereed

Bibliographical note

Published online: 10 Aug 2015, journal issue (vol.32, N5) appeared in 2016
Volume:
Proceeding volume:

Fields of Science

  • 517 Political science
  • authoritarianism
  • Russia
  • governance
  • political institutions
  • neopatrimonialism

Cite this

@article{2e662f3f606b46909a0a32f49c5e3dfc,
title = "The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia",
abstract = "Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socio-economic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs discovered these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-{\`a}-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?",
keywords = "517 Political science, authoritarianism, Russia , governance, political institutions, neopatrimonialism",
author = "Vladimir Gel'man",
note = "Published online: 10 Aug 2015, journal issue (vol.32, N5) appeared in 2016 Volume: Proceeding volume:",
year = "2015",
month = "8",
doi = "10.1080/1060586X.2015.1071014",
language = "English",
volume = "32",
pages = "455--473",
journal = "Post-Soviet Affairs",
issn = "1060-586X",
publisher = "TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD",
number = "5",

}

The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia. / Gel'man, Vladimir.

In: Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 32, No. 5, 08.2015, p. 455-473.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism in Russia

AU - Gel'man, Vladimir

N1 - Published online: 10 Aug 2015, journal issue (vol.32, N5) appeared in 2016 Volume: Proceeding volume:

PY - 2015/8

Y1 - 2015/8

N2 - Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socio-economic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs discovered these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-à-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?

AB - Since the collapse of Communism, Russia and some other post-Soviet states have attempted to pursue socio-economic reforms while relying upon the political institutions of neopatrimonialism. This politico-economic order was established to serve the interests of ruling groups and establish the major features of states, political regimes, and market economies. It provided numerous negative incentives for governing the economy and the state due to the unconstrained rent seeking behavior of major actors. Policy reform programs discovered these institutions to be incompatible with the priorities of modernization, and efforts to resolve these contradictions through a number of partial and compromise solutions often worsened the situation vis-à-vis preservation of the status quo. The ruling groups lack incentives for institutional changes, which could undermine their political and economic dominance, and are caught in a vicious circle: reforms often result in minor returns or cause unintended and undesired consequences. What are the possible domestic and international incentives to reject the political institutions of neopatrimonialism in post-Soviet states and replace them with inclusive economic and political ones?

KW - 517 Political science

KW - authoritarianism

KW - Russia

KW - governance

KW - political institutions

KW - neopatrimonialism

UR - http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1071014?tokenDomain=eprints&tokenAccess=i5xgYGqN8jEuxTVU2er5&forwardService=showFullText&doi=10.1080%2F1060586X.2015.1071014#.VdYt2hbotdg

U2 - 10.1080/1060586X.2015.1071014

DO - 10.1080/1060586X.2015.1071014

M3 - Article

VL - 32

SP - 455

EP - 473

JO - Post-Soviet Affairs

JF - Post-Soviet Affairs

SN - 1060-586X

IS - 5

ER -