Too Big to Cheat: Mining Pools' Incentives to Double Spend in Blockchain Based Cryptocurrencies

Jorge Soria Ruiz-Ogarrio, Ville Savolainen

Research output: Conference materialsPaper


In most blockchain based cryptocurrencies majority of verification power is required for facilitating a successful double spending attack, i.e. using the same funds multiple times. Because possibility to double spend sharply deteriorates trust and value, concentration is traditionally considered to be a significant problem.
We model agents’ incentives to facilitate double spending attacks under opportunity costs. Contrary to a host of previous literature, our main findings indicate that under meager economic profits large miners have higher incentives to act honestly than outsiders even in the absence of any direct costs. Intuitively, mining pools holding substantial amounts of power in a cryptocurrency also have much to lose if the value collapses.
Original languageEnglish
Publication statusPublished - 11 Jun 2019
MoE publication typeNot Eligible
EventGSF and FDPE Summer Workshop in Finance - University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Finland
Duration: 10 Jun 201910 Jun 2019


ConferenceGSF and FDPE Summer Workshop in Finance
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Fields of Science

  • 511 Economics
  • cryptocurrency
  • Microeconomics
  • Finance
  • Blockchain

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