Bohm's approach and individuality

Paavo Pylkkänen, Basil Hiley, Ilkka Pättiniemi

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Kuvaus

Ladyman and Ross (LR) 2007 argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times (Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993). This would suggest that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being the property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another. However, LR refer to research by Brown et al. (1996) which they interpret as saying that in BT, the properties normally associated with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are inherent only in the quantum field and not in the particles (in BT it is assumed that a particle is always accompanied by a quantum field). It would then seem that there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the existence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems that haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we point out, following Brown et al.(1996, 1999) that it is reasonable to assume that in BT properties such as mass and charge also reside in the particles (the principle of generosity). Thus, if BT is correct, quantum objects might be individuals after all. However, we move on to emphasize that Bohmian quantum individuals, while in some ways similar to classical particles, also differ from these radically. We will discuss this issue in
the light of new developments in the underlying mathematical structures, due to de Gosson and Hiley. In particular, we will show how the mathematical structure of the double cover of the underlying symmetry groups help to understand the relation between classical dynamics and quantum dynamics, as well as the similarities and differences between classical and quantum individuals. We conclude that while BT enables us to retain the notion of individuals in non-relativistic quantum theory, these individuals are very different from those of classical physics. It is likely that they can be best understood in the context of a structuralist, process-oriented view, such as Bohm and Hiley’s broader implicate order framework. Thus, while we think that the prospects of individuality in quantum theory are stronger than what LR imply, we agree with them that structuralist considerations are important in fundamental physics more generally.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
OtsikkoIndividuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?
ToimittajatA. Guay, T. Pradeu
Sivumäärä28
Vuosikerta2016
JulkaisupaikkaNew York
KustantajaOxford University Press
Julkaisupäivä2016
ISBN (painettu)978-0-19-938251-4
TilaJulkaistu - 2016
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA3 Kirjan tai muun kokoomateoksen osa

Tieteenalat

  • 6162 Kognitiotiede

Lainaa tätä

Pylkkänen, P., Hiley, B., & Pättiniemi, I. (2016). Bohm's approach and individuality. teoksessa A. Guay, & T. Pradeu (Toimittajat), Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics? (Vuosikerta 2016). New York: Oxford University Press.
Pylkkänen, Paavo ; Hiley, Basil ; Pättiniemi, Ilkka. / Bohm's approach and individuality. Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?. Toimittaja / A. Guay ; T. Pradeu. Vuosikerta 2016 New York : Oxford University Press, 2016.
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title = "Bohm's approach and individuality",
abstract = "Ladyman and Ross (LR) 2007 argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times (Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993). This would suggest that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being the property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another. However, LR refer to research by Brown et al. (1996) which they interpret as saying that in BT, the properties normally associated with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are inherent only in the quantum field and not in the particles (in BT it is assumed that a particle is always accompanied by a quantum field). It would then seem that there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the existence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems that haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we point out, following Brown et al.(1996, 1999) that it is reasonable to assume that in BT properties such as mass and charge also reside in the particles (the principle of generosity). Thus, if BT is correct, quantum objects might be individuals after all. However, we move on to emphasize that Bohmian quantum individuals, while in some ways similar to classical particles, also differ from these radically. We will discuss this issue inthe light of new developments in the underlying mathematical structures, due to de Gosson and Hiley. In particular, we will show how the mathematical structure of the double cover of the underlying symmetry groups help to understand the relation between classical dynamics and quantum dynamics, as well as the similarities and differences between classical and quantum individuals. We conclude that while BT enables us to retain the notion of individuals in non-relativistic quantum theory, these individuals are very different from those of classical physics. It is likely that they can be best understood in the context of a structuralist, process-oriented view, such as Bohm and Hiley’s broader implicate order framework. Thus, while we think that the prospects of individuality in quantum theory are stronger than what LR imply, we agree with them that structuralist considerations are important in fundamental physics more generally.",
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Pylkkänen, P, Hiley, B & Pättiniemi, I 2016, Bohm's approach and individuality. julkaisussa A Guay & T Pradeu (toim), Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?. Vuosikerta 2016, Oxford University Press, New York.

Bohm's approach and individuality. / Pylkkänen, Paavo; Hiley, Basil; Pättiniemi, Ilkka.

Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?. toim. / A. Guay; T. Pradeu. Vuosikerta 2016 New York : Oxford University Press, 2016.

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

TY - CHAP

T1 - Bohm's approach and individuality

AU - Pylkkänen, Paavo

AU - Hiley, Basil

AU - Pättiniemi, Ilkka

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Ladyman and Ross (LR) 2007 argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times (Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993). This would suggest that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being the property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another. However, LR refer to research by Brown et al. (1996) which they interpret as saying that in BT, the properties normally associated with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are inherent only in the quantum field and not in the particles (in BT it is assumed that a particle is always accompanied by a quantum field). It would then seem that there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the existence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems that haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we point out, following Brown et al.(1996, 1999) that it is reasonable to assume that in BT properties such as mass and charge also reside in the particles (the principle of generosity). Thus, if BT is correct, quantum objects might be individuals after all. However, we move on to emphasize that Bohmian quantum individuals, while in some ways similar to classical particles, also differ from these radically. We will discuss this issue inthe light of new developments in the underlying mathematical structures, due to de Gosson and Hiley. In particular, we will show how the mathematical structure of the double cover of the underlying symmetry groups help to understand the relation between classical dynamics and quantum dynamics, as well as the similarities and differences between classical and quantum individuals. We conclude that while BT enables us to retain the notion of individuals in non-relativistic quantum theory, these individuals are very different from those of classical physics. It is likely that they can be best understood in the context of a structuralist, process-oriented view, such as Bohm and Hiley’s broader implicate order framework. Thus, while we think that the prospects of individuality in quantum theory are stronger than what LR imply, we agree with them that structuralist considerations are important in fundamental physics more generally.

AB - Ladyman and Ross (LR) 2007 argue that quantum objects are not individuals (or are at most weakly discernible individuals) and use this idea to ground their metaphysical view, ontic structural realism, according to which relational structures are primary to things. LR acknowledge that there is a version of quantum theory, namely the Bohm theory (BT), according to which particles do have definite trajectories at all times (Bohm 1952; Bohm and Hiley 1993). This would suggest that quantum particles are individuals after all, with position being the property in virtue of which particles are always different from one another. However, LR refer to research by Brown et al. (1996) which they interpret as saying that in BT, the properties normally associated with particles (mass, charge, etc.) are inherent only in the quantum field and not in the particles (in BT it is assumed that a particle is always accompanied by a quantum field). It would then seem that there is nothing there in the trajectories unless one assumes the existence of some “raw stuff” of the particle. In other words it seems that haecceities are needed for the individuality of particles of BT, and LR dismiss this as idle metaphysics. In this paper we point out, following Brown et al.(1996, 1999) that it is reasonable to assume that in BT properties such as mass and charge also reside in the particles (the principle of generosity). Thus, if BT is correct, quantum objects might be individuals after all. However, we move on to emphasize that Bohmian quantum individuals, while in some ways similar to classical particles, also differ from these radically. We will discuss this issue inthe light of new developments in the underlying mathematical structures, due to de Gosson and Hiley. In particular, we will show how the mathematical structure of the double cover of the underlying symmetry groups help to understand the relation between classical dynamics and quantum dynamics, as well as the similarities and differences between classical and quantum individuals. We conclude that while BT enables us to retain the notion of individuals in non-relativistic quantum theory, these individuals are very different from those of classical physics. It is likely that they can be best understood in the context of a structuralist, process-oriented view, such as Bohm and Hiley’s broader implicate order framework. Thus, while we think that the prospects of individuality in quantum theory are stronger than what LR imply, we agree with them that structuralist considerations are important in fundamental physics more generally.

KW - 6162 Cognitive science

M3 - Chapter

SN - 978-0-19-938251-4

VL - 2016

BT - Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?

A2 - Guay, A.

A2 - Pradeu, T.

PB - Oxford University Press

CY - New York

ER -

Pylkkänen P, Hiley B, Pättiniemi I. Bohm's approach and individuality. julkaisussa Guay A, Pradeu T, toimittajat, Individuals Across Sciences: A Revisionary Metaphysics?. Vuosikerta 2016. New York: Oxford University Press. 2016