Collective Agents as Moral Actors

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Abstrakti

How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? My argument is that collective agents do not have to qualify as moral agents for us to make sense of their responsibility. Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognizing moral considerations and reasons. It also necessitates the ability to react reflexively to moral matters, i.e., to take into account new moral concerns when they arise. While members of a collective agent are capable of this, the collective frames the thinking of the individual moral agents within it and affects their options in myriad ways. The moral positions thus formed and expressed belong to the collective. Crucially, unlike marginal moral agents, collective agents as moral actors can be held fully responsible for their acts and omissions.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
OtsikkoCollective Responsibility : Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology
ToimittajatSäde Hormio, Bill Wringe
Sivumäärä17
KustantajaSpringer
Julkaisupäivämarrask. 2024
Sivut49-65
ISBN (painettu)978-3-031-68717-4
ISBN (elektroninen)978-3-031-68718-1
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - marrask. 2024
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA3 Kirjan tai muun kokoomateoksen osa

Julkaisusarja

NimiStudies in the Philosophy of Sociality
ISSN (painettu)2542-9094
ISSN (elektroninen)2542-9108

Tieteenalat

  • 611 Filosofia

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