Disagreement, Skepticism and the Dialectical Conception of Justification

Tutkimustuotos: ArtikkelijulkaisuArtikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Abstrakti

It is a common intuition that at least in some cases disagreement has skeptical consequences: the participants are not justifi ed in persisting in their beliefs. I will argue that the currently popular non-dialectical and individualistic accounts of justifi cation, such as evidentialism and reliabilism, cannot explain this intuition and defend the dialectical conception of justifi cation that can explain it. I will also argue that this sort of justifi cation is a necessary condition of knowledge by
relying on Craig’s genealogy of the concept of knowledge. I will then respond to the accusation that the dialectical conception leads to radical skepticism. My response is partly concessive. It does lead to skepticism in areas where controversy prevails, such as philosophy, politics and religion, but this sort of skepticism is quite intuitive. Finally, I deal with the objection that my defense of skepticism about philosophy is self-refuting.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
LehtiInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism
Vuosikerta1
Numero1
Sivut3-17
Sivumäärä15
TilaJulkaistu - 2011
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä, vertaisarvioitu

Tieteenalat

  • 611 Filosofia

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