This article deals with the institutional implications for the European Union resulting from debt relations. It suggests that despite original efforts to tame them, as a consequence of a series of events both in the international monetary order and the European integration process, power games lying behind debt relations have finally sprouted –with special virulence after the great recession. Although the causes have been brewing for a long time (in this regard the end of the monetary order established at Bretton Woods and the liberalisation of capital movements have been key factors), it is only in the post-economic crisis context that concrete examples of debt-based power games are observable in the institutional system. In hindsight, a line can actually be drawn tracing a transformation in the principle underlying EU constitutional law and its institutions: from promoting equality among its Member States to reflecting their (now persistent and increasingly divergent) economic power.
|Lehti||European Law Journal|
|DOI - pysyväislinkit|
|Tila||Julkaistu - 25 toukokuuta 2017|
|OKM-julkaisutyyppi||A1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä, vertaisarvioitu|
- 513 Oikeustiede
- 517 Valtio-oppi, hallintotiede