Memory as a cognitive kind: Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Kuvaus

Theories of natural kinds can be seen to face a twofold task: First, they should provide an ontological account of what kinds of (fundamental) things there are, what exists. The second task is an epistemological one, accounting for the inductive reliability of acceptable scientific concepts. In this chapter I examine whether concepts and categories used in the cognitive sciences should be understood as natural kinds. By using examples from human memory research to illustrate my argument, I critically examine some of the main contenders for a theory of natural kinds. I show that when applied to complex target domains – such as human cognition – both essentialist theories and more liberal accounts of natural kindhood (such as HPC theory) fail to simultaneously satisfy the ontological and epistemological desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. I argue, however, that natural kindhood of a category in a metaphysical sense is not necessary for its inductive reliability, and that HPC theory provides an analytically useful account of the grounds of category-based inductive inference.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
OtsikkoNatural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice
ToimittajatCatherine Kendig
Sivumäärä12
JulkaisupaikkaAbingdon
KustantajaRoutledge - Taylor & Francis Group
Julkaisupäiväjoulukuuta 2015
Sivut145-156
ISBN (painettu)9781848935402
TilaJulkaistu - joulukuuta 2015
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA3 Kirjan tai muun kokoomateoksen osa

Julkaisusarja

NimiHistory and Philosophy of Biology

Tieteenalat

  • 515 Psykologia
  • 611 Filosofia

Lainaa tätä

Pöyhönen, H. S. (2015). Memory as a cognitive kind: Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms. teoksessa C. Kendig (Toimittaja), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice (Sivut 145-156 ). (History and Philosophy of Biology). Abingdon: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group.
Pöyhönen, Heikki Samuli. / Memory as a cognitive kind : Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms. Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Toimittaja / Catherine Kendig. Abingdon : Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. Sivut 145-156 (History and Philosophy of Biology).
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Pöyhönen, HS 2015, Memory as a cognitive kind: Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms. julkaisussa C Kendig (Toimittaja), Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. History and Philosophy of Biology, Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, Abingdon, Sivut 145-156 .

Memory as a cognitive kind : Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms. / Pöyhönen, Heikki Samuli.

Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. toim. / Catherine Kendig. Abingdon : Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group, 2015. s. 145-156 (History and Philosophy of Biology).

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

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AB - Theories of natural kinds can be seen to face a twofold task: First, they should provide an ontological account of what kinds of (fundamental) things there are, what exists. The second task is an epistemological one, accounting for the inductive reliability of acceptable scientific concepts. In this chapter I examine whether concepts and categories used in the cognitive sciences should be understood as natural kinds. By using examples from human memory research to illustrate my argument, I critically examine some of the main contenders for a theory of natural kinds. I show that when applied to complex target domains – such as human cognition – both essentialist theories and more liberal accounts of natural kindhood (such as HPC theory) fail to simultaneously satisfy the ontological and epistemological desiderata for a theory of natural kinds. I argue, however, that natural kindhood of a category in a metaphysical sense is not necessary for its inductive reliability, and that HPC theory provides an analytically useful account of the grounds of category-based inductive inference.

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Pöyhönen HS. Memory as a cognitive kind: Brains, remembering dyads, and exograms. julkaisussa Kendig C, toimittaja, Natural Kinds and Classification in Scientific Practice. Abingdon: Routledge - Taylor & Francis Group. 2015. s. 145-156 . (History and Philosophy of Biology).