Social Nudges: Their mechanisms and justification

Tutkimustuotos: ArtikkelijulkaisuArtikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Kuvaus

In this paper I argue that the use of social nudges, policy interventions to induce voluntary cooperation in social dilemma situations, can be defended against two ethical objections which I call objections from coherence and autonomy. Specifically, I argue that the kind of preference change caused by social nudges is not a threat to agents’ coherent preference structure, and that there is a way in which social nudges influence behavior while respecting the agent’s capacity to reason. I base my arguments on two mechanistic explanations of social nudges, the expectation-based and frame- based accounts. As a concrete example of social nudges, I choose the “Don’t Mess With Texas” anti-littering campaign and discuss in some detail how it may have worked.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
LehtiReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Vuosikerta6
Numero3
Sivut481-494
Sivumäärä14
ISSN1878-5158
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - syyskuuta 2015
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA1 Alkuperäisartikkeli tieteellisessä aikakauslehdessä, vertaisarvioitu

Tieteenalat

  • 611 Filosofia

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Social Nudges : Their mechanisms and justification. / Nagatsu, Michiru.

julkaisussa: Review of Philosophy and Psychology, Vuosikerta 6, Nro 3, 09.2015, s. 481-494.

Tutkimustuotos: ArtikkelijulkaisuArtikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

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AB - In this paper I argue that the use of social nudges, policy interventions to induce voluntary cooperation in social dilemma situations, can be defended against two ethical objections which I call objections from coherence and autonomy. Specifically, I argue that the kind of preference change caused by social nudges is not a threat to agents’ coherent preference structure, and that there is a way in which social nudges influence behavior while respecting the agent’s capacity to reason. I base my arguments on two mechanistic explanations of social nudges, the expectation-based and frame- based accounts. As a concrete example of social nudges, I choose the “Don’t Mess With Texas” anti-littering campaign and discuss in some detail how it may have worked.

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