Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies

Tutkimustuotos: Kirja/raporttiTutkimusraportti


Open access drives fisheries to inefficient harvest rates and promotes stock collapses. International agreements are often necessary for exclusion of open access because many fish resources are spread across national boundaries and international waters. We parameterized an age-structured model for the North Sea herring fishery. The trigger points of the current harvest control rule are developed from spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate ceiling operationalizing the precautionary approach. Applying the precautionary approach by the grand coalition through a harvest control rule adds the net present value of the fishery compared to another management approach, a fixed fishing mortality rate strategy. The fishing strategy and costs have a strong impact on the stability of the coalitions. Adopting a precautionary harvest control rule has potential to stabilize multilateral fishing agreements provided that fishing costs are not identical among countries. If they are identical, there will always be incentive for free riding and multinational fishing agreement is never stable. When the stability of the grand coalition fails, it does not pay off for a partial coalition to apply a harvest control rule if the outside player does not comply with it and harvests using an optimal fixed fishing mortality rate.
TilaJulkaistu - 2008
OKM-julkaisutyyppiD4 Julkaistu kehittämis- tai tutkimusraportti taikka -selvitys


NimiUniversity of Helsinki, Department of Economics and Management, Environmental Economics. Discussion Papers
ISSN (elektroninen)1459-9996

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