Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKonferenssiartikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Kuvaus

Open access drives fisheries to inefficient harvest rates and ultimately to stock collapses. International agreements are often necessary for exclusion of open access because many fish resources are spread across national boundaries and international waters. In fisheries economics, game theory is a common tool for analysing the strategic interactions of different countries. The main point is that all countries should be better off by cooperating, i.e. by complying with the
agreement, than noncooperating. We parameterized an agestructured
bioeconomic model for the North Sea herring fishery to analyse the economic impact of harvest control rule on this fishery. The trigger points, linked to spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate ceiling, of the current harvest control rule can be regarded as strategic bioeconomic reference points which are
operationalizing the precautionary approach. Applying precautionary approach by the grand coalition through HCR adds net present value of the fishery compared to case when only F is optimized. However, it does not pay off for a partial coalition to apply harvest control rule if the outside player does not comply with it and harvests using an optimal fixed fishing mortality rate.
The coalition structure and the fishing costs have an impact on the optimal fishing strategies of the countries. The grand coalition is stable only when low fishing costs are assumed. If fishing costs are identical among countries, there will be incentive for free riding and multinational fishing agreement is never stable. However, HCR has potential of stabilizing multilateral fishing agreements if fishing costs are high.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
OtsikkoICES CM Documents 2008
Sivumäärä17
JulkaisupaikkaCopenhagen
KustantajaInternational Council for the Exploration of the Sea
Julkaisupäivä2008
ISBN (elektroninen)978-87-7482-064-2
TilaJulkaistu - 2008
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA4 Artikkeli konferenssijulkaisuussa
TapahtumaICES Annual Science Conference - Halifax, Kanada
Kesto: 22 syyskuuta 200826 syyskuuta 2008

Lainaa tätä

Rahikainen, M., Lindroos, M., & Kaitala, V. (2008). Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies. teoksessa ICES CM Documents 2008 Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea.
Rahikainen, Mika ; Lindroos, Marko ; Kaitala, Veijo. / Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies. ICES CM Documents 2008. Copenhagen : International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2008.
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title = "Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies",
abstract = "Open access drives fisheries to inefficient harvest rates and ultimately to stock collapses. International agreements are often necessary for exclusion of open access because many fish resources are spread across national boundaries and international waters. In fisheries economics, game theory is a common tool for analysing the strategic interactions of different countries. The main point is that all countries should be better off by cooperating, i.e. by complying with theagreement, than noncooperating. We parameterized an agestructuredbioeconomic model for the North Sea herring fishery to analyse the economic impact of harvest control rule on this fishery. The trigger points, linked to spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate ceiling, of the current harvest control rule can be regarded as strategic bioeconomic reference points which areoperationalizing the precautionary approach. Applying precautionary approach by the grand coalition through HCR adds net present value of the fishery compared to case when only F is optimized. However, it does not pay off for a partial coalition to apply harvest control rule if the outside player does not comply with it and harvests using an optimal fixed fishing mortality rate.The coalition structure and the fishing costs have an impact on the optimal fishing strategies of the countries. The grand coalition is stable only when low fishing costs are assumed. If fishing costs are identical among countries, there will be incentive for free riding and multinational fishing agreement is never stable. However, HCR has potential of stabilizing multilateral fishing agreements if fishing costs are high.",
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Rahikainen, M, Lindroos, M & Kaitala, V 2008, Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies. julkaisussa ICES CM Documents 2008. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, Copenhagen, ICES Annual Science Conference, Halifax, Kanada, 22/09/2008.

Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies. / Rahikainen, Mika; Lindroos, Marko; Kaitala, Veijo.

ICES CM Documents 2008. Copenhagen : International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2008.

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKonferenssiartikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

TY - GEN

T1 - Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies

AU - Rahikainen, Mika

AU - Lindroos, Marko

AU - Kaitala, Veijo

N1 - Volume: Proceeding volume:

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - Open access drives fisheries to inefficient harvest rates and ultimately to stock collapses. International agreements are often necessary for exclusion of open access because many fish resources are spread across national boundaries and international waters. In fisheries economics, game theory is a common tool for analysing the strategic interactions of different countries. The main point is that all countries should be better off by cooperating, i.e. by complying with theagreement, than noncooperating. We parameterized an agestructuredbioeconomic model for the North Sea herring fishery to analyse the economic impact of harvest control rule on this fishery. The trigger points, linked to spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate ceiling, of the current harvest control rule can be regarded as strategic bioeconomic reference points which areoperationalizing the precautionary approach. Applying precautionary approach by the grand coalition through HCR adds net present value of the fishery compared to case when only F is optimized. However, it does not pay off for a partial coalition to apply harvest control rule if the outside player does not comply with it and harvests using an optimal fixed fishing mortality rate.The coalition structure and the fishing costs have an impact on the optimal fishing strategies of the countries. The grand coalition is stable only when low fishing costs are assumed. If fishing costs are identical among countries, there will be incentive for free riding and multinational fishing agreement is never stable. However, HCR has potential of stabilizing multilateral fishing agreements if fishing costs are high.

AB - Open access drives fisheries to inefficient harvest rates and ultimately to stock collapses. International agreements are often necessary for exclusion of open access because many fish resources are spread across national boundaries and international waters. In fisheries economics, game theory is a common tool for analysing the strategic interactions of different countries. The main point is that all countries should be better off by cooperating, i.e. by complying with theagreement, than noncooperating. We parameterized an agestructuredbioeconomic model for the North Sea herring fishery to analyse the economic impact of harvest control rule on this fishery. The trigger points, linked to spawning stock biomass and fishing mortality rate ceiling, of the current harvest control rule can be regarded as strategic bioeconomic reference points which areoperationalizing the precautionary approach. Applying precautionary approach by the grand coalition through HCR adds net present value of the fishery compared to case when only F is optimized. However, it does not pay off for a partial coalition to apply harvest control rule if the outside player does not comply with it and harvests using an optimal fixed fishing mortality rate.The coalition structure and the fishing costs have an impact on the optimal fishing strategies of the countries. The grand coalition is stable only when low fishing costs are assumed. If fishing costs are identical among countries, there will be incentive for free riding and multinational fishing agreement is never stable. However, HCR has potential of stabilizing multilateral fishing agreements if fishing costs are high.

M3 - Conference contribution

BT - ICES CM Documents 2008

PB - International Council for the Exploration of the Sea

CY - Copenhagen

ER -

Rahikainen M, Lindroos M, Kaitala V. Stability of international fisheries agreements using precautionary bioeconomic harvesting strategies. julkaisussa ICES CM Documents 2008. Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. 2008