Too Big to Cheat: Mining Pools' Incentives to Double Spend in Blockchain Based Cryptocurrencies

Jorge Soria Ruiz-Ogarrio, Ville Savolainen

Tutkimustuotos: KonferenssimateriaalitKonferenssiesitys

Abstrakti

In most blockchain based cryptocurrencies majority of verification power is required for facilitating a successful double spending attack, i.e. using the same funds multiple times. Because possibility to double spend sharply deteriorates trust and value, concentration is traditionally considered to be a significant problem.
We model agents’ incentives to facilitate double spending attacks under opportunity costs. Contrary to a host of previous literature, our main findings indicate that under meager economic profits large miners have higher incentives to act honestly than outsiders even in the absence of any direct costs. Intuitively, mining pools holding substantial amounts of power in a cryptocurrency also have much to lose if the value collapses.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
TilaJulkaistu - 11 kesäkuuta 2019
OKM-julkaisutyyppiEi sovellu
TapahtumaGSF and FDPE Summer Workshop in Finance - University of Jyväskylä, Jyväskylä, Suomi
Kesto: 10 kesäkuuta 201910 kesäkuuta 2019
http://gsf.aalto.fi/summer_workshop.html

Konferenssi

KonferenssiGSF and FDPE Summer Workshop in Finance
MaaSuomi
KaupunkiJyväskylä
Ajanjakso10/06/201910/06/2019
www-osoite

Tieteenalat

  • 511 Kansantaloustiede
  • Kryptovaluutat
  • Mikrotaloustiede
  • Rahoitus
  • Lohkoketju

Siteeraa tätä

Soria Ruiz-Ogarrio, J., & Savolainen, V. (2019). Too Big to Cheat: Mining Pools' Incentives to Double Spend in Blockchain Based Cryptocurrencies. Julkaisun esittämispaikka: GSF and FDPE Summer Workshop in Finance, Jyväskylä, Suomi.