Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

Michiru Nagatsu, Chiara Lisciandra

Tutkimustuotos: Artikkeli kirjassa/raportissa/konferenssijulkaisussaKirjan luku tai artikkeliTieteellinenvertaisarvioitu

Abstrakti

The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.
Alkuperäiskielienglanti
OtsikkoThe genealogy of self-interest in economics
ToimittajatSusumu Egashira, Masanobu Taishido, Wade Hands, Uskali Mäki
Sivumäärä20
JulkaisupaikkaSingapore
KustantajaSpringer
Julkaisupäivä2021
Sivut289-308
ISBN (painettu)978-981-15-9394-9, 978-981-15-9397-0
ISBN (elektroninen)978-981-15-9395-6
DOI - pysyväislinkit
TilaJulkaistu - 2021
OKM-julkaisutyyppiA3 Kirjan tai muun kokoomateoksen osa

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