A virtue reliabilist solution to Moore's paradox

Jaakko Hirvelä

doi:10.1007/s11229-023-04392-z

A virtue reliabilist solution to Moore's paradox

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Sammanfattning

Most of the literature surrounding virtue reliabilism revolves around issues pertaining to the analysis of knowledge. With the exception of the lottery paradox, virtue reliabilists have paid relatively little attention to classic epistemological paradoxes, such as Moore’s paradox. This is a significant omission given how central role such paradoxes have in epistemic theorizing. In this essay I take a step towards remedying this shortcoming by providing a solution to Moore’s paradox. The solution that I offer stems directly from the core of virtue reliabilism.

Originalspråk	engelska
Artikelnummer	158
Tidskrift	Synthese
Volym	202
Antal sidor	14
ISSN	0039-7857
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04392-z
Status	Publicerad - 2 nov. 2023
MoE-publikationstyp	A1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

Vetenskapsgrenar

611 Filosofi

Åtkomst av dokument

10.1007/s11229-023-04392-zLicens: CC BY

s11229-023-04392-zSlutlig publicerad version, 805 KBLicens: CC BY

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