Agency, Experience, and Future Bias

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Sammanfattning

In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit (1984) observed that most people are biased towards the future at least when it comes to pain and pleasure. That is, they regard a given amount of pain as less bad when it is in the past than when it is in the future, and a given amount of pleasure as less good. While Parfit (implicitly) held that this bias is rational, it has recently come under effective attack by temporal neutralists, who have offered cases that with plausible auxiliary assumptions appear to be counterexamples to the rationality claim. I'm going to argue that these cases and the rationale behind them only suffice to motivate a more limited rejection of future bias, and that constrained future bias is indeed rationally permissible. My argument turns on the distinct rational implications of action‐guiding and pure temporal preferences. I'll argue that future bias is rational when it comes to the latter, even if not the former. As I'll say, Only Action Fixes Utility: it is only when you act on the basis of assigning a utility to an outcome that you rationally commit to giving it the same value when it is past as when it is in the future.
Originalspråkengelska
TidskriftThought: A Journal of Philosophy
Volym7
Nummer4
Sidor (från-till)237-245
Antal sidor9
ISSN2161-2234
DOI
StatusPublicerad - dec. 2018
MoE-publikationstypA1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

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