Projekt per år
Sammanfattning
How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? My argument is that collective agents do not have to qualify as moral agents for us to make sense of their responsibility. Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognizing moral considerations and reasons. It also necessitates the ability to react reflexively to moral matters, i.e., to take into account new moral concerns when they arise. While members of a collective agent are capable of this, the collective frames the thinking of the individual moral agents within it and affects their options in myriad ways. The moral positions thus formed and expressed belong to the collective. Crucially, unlike marginal moral agents, collective agents as moral actors can be held fully responsible for their acts and omissions.
Originalspråk | engelska |
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Titel på värdpublikation | Collective Responsibility : Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology |
Redaktörer | Säde Hormio, Bill Wringe |
Antal sidor | 17 |
Förlag | Springer |
Utgivningsdatum | nov. 2024 |
Sidor | 49-65 |
ISBN (tryckt) | 978-3-031-68717-4 |
ISBN (elektroniskt) | 978-3-031-68718-1 |
DOI | |
Status | Publicerad - nov. 2024 |
MoE-publikationstyp | A3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok |
Publikationsserier
Namn | Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality |
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ISSN (tryckt) | 2542-9094 |
ISSN (elektroniskt) | 2542-9108 |
Vetenskapsgrenar
- 611 Filosofi
Projekt
- 1 Slutfört
-
CIRICC: Complicity: Individual Responsibility in Collective Contexts
Hormio, S. (Projektledare)
Marie Sklodowska-Curie Actions Individual Fellowships programme
01/08/2019 → 31/07/2021
Projekt: Forskningsprojekt