Collective Agents as Moral Actors

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How should we make sense of praise and blame and other such reactions towards collective agents like governments, universities, or corporations? My argument is that collective agents do not have to qualify as moral agents for us to make sense of their responsibility. Collective agents can be appropriate targets for our moral feelings and judgements because they can maintain and express moral positions of their own. Moral agency requires being capable of recognizing moral considerations and reasons. It also necessitates the ability to react reflexively to moral matters, i.e., to take into account new moral concerns when they arise. While members of a collective agent are capable of this, the collective frames the thinking of the individual moral agents within it and affects their options in myriad ways. The moral positions thus formed and expressed belong to the collective. Crucially, unlike marginal moral agents, collective agents as moral actors can be held fully responsible for their acts and omissions.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på värdpublikationCollective Responsibility : Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology
RedaktörerSäde Hormio, Bill Wringe
Antal sidor17
FörlagSpringer
Utgivningsdatumnov. 2024
Sidor49-65
ISBN (tryckt)978-3-031-68717-4
ISBN (elektroniskt)978-3-031-68718-1
DOI
StatusPublicerad - nov. 2024
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Publikationsserier

NamnStudies in the Philosophy of Sociality
ISSN (tryckt)2542-9094
ISSN (elektroniskt)2542-9108

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 611 Filosofi

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