Controversial views and moral realism

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Sammanfattning

It is argued that the emergence of controversial views in discussions of theoretical medicine and bioethics is best explained by the assumption of moral realism within those discursive practices. Neither of the main alternatives of realism in contemporary meta-ethics - moral expressivism and anti-realism - can account for the rise of controversies in the bioethical debate. This argument draws from the contemporary expressivist or anti-representationalist pragmatism as advanced by Richard Rorty and Huw Price, as well as the pragmatist scientific realism and fallibilism of the founder of pragmatism, Charles S. Peirce. In accordance with the fallibilist view, it is proposed that presenting controversial positions may serve epistemic purposes within bioethical debates, providing opportunities for inquiry by pointing towards problems to be solved and arguments and evidence for and against to be put forward.
Originalspråkengelska
TidskriftTheoretical Medicine and Bioethics
Volym44
Nummer2
Sidor (från-till)165–176
Antal sidor12
ISSN1386-7415
DOI
StatusPublicerad - apr. 2023
MoE-publikationstypA1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad

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