Sammanfattning
Some people willingly risk or give up their lives for something they deeply believe in, for instance standing up to a dictator. A good example of this are members of the White Rose student resistance group, who rebelled against the Nazi regime and paid for it with their lives. I argue that when the cause is good, such risky activities (and even deaths themselves) can contribute to meaning in life in its different forms – meaning-as-mattering, meaning-as-purpose, and meaning-as-intelligibility. Such cases highlight the importance of integrity, or living up to one's commitments, in meaningful living, or dying, as it may be, as well as the risk involved in commitment, since if you die for a bad cause, you have only harmed yourself. However, if leading a more rather than less meaningful life benefits rather than harms you, there are possible scenarios in which you yourself are better off dying for a good cause than living a longer moderately happy life. This presents a version of a well-known puzzle: what, then, makes dying for a cause a self-sacrifice, as it usually seems to be? I sketch some possible answers, and critically examine relevant work in empirical psychology.
Originalspråk | engelska |
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Tidskrift | Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement |
Volym | 90 |
Sidor (från-till) | 57-80 |
Antal sidor | 24 |
ISSN | 1358-2461 |
DOI | |
Status | Publicerad - 2021 |
MoE-publikationstyp | A1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad |
Vetenskapsgrenar
- 611 Filosofi