Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise

Carlo Martini, Jan Sprenger

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

Group judgments are often influenced by their members’ individual expertise. It is less clear, though, how individual expertise should affect the group judgments. This chapter surveys a wide range of models of opinion aggregation and group judgment: models where all group members have the same impact on the group judgment, models that take into account differences in individual accuracy, and models where group members revise their beliefs as a function of their mutual respect. The scope of these models covers the aggregation of propositional attitudes, probability functions, and numerical estimates. By comparing these different kinds of models and contrasting them with findings in psychology, management science, and the expert judgment literature, the chapter provides a better understanding of the role of expertise in group agency, both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective. © Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på gästpublikationScientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge : New Essays
RedaktörerThomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson, Michael Weisberg
Antal sidor22
FörlagOxford University Press USA
Utgivningsdatum1 jan 2017
Sidor180-201
ISBN (tryckt)9780190680534
ISBN (elektroniskt)9780190680558
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 1 jan 2017
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 611 Filosofi

Citera det här

Martini, C., & Sprenger, J. (2017). Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise. I T. Boyer-Kassem, C. Mayo-Wilson, & M. Weisberg (Red.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays (s. 180-201). Oxford University Press USA. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190680534.003.0009
Martini, Carlo ; Sprenger, Jan. / Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise. Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays. redaktör / Thomas Boyer-Kassem ; Conor Mayo-Wilson ; Michael Weisberg. Oxford University Press USA, 2017. s. 180-201
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Martini, C & Sprenger, J 2017, Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise. i T Boyer-Kassem, C Mayo-Wilson & M Weisberg (red), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays. Oxford University Press USA, s. 180-201. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190680534.003.0009

Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise. / Martini, Carlo; Sprenger, Jan.

Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays. red. / Thomas Boyer-Kassem; Conor Mayo-Wilson; Michael Weisberg. Oxford University Press USA, 2017. s. 180-201.

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

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AB - Group judgments are often influenced by their members’ individual expertise. It is less clear, though, how individual expertise should affect the group judgments. This chapter surveys a wide range of models of opinion aggregation and group judgment: models where all group members have the same impact on the group judgment, models that take into account differences in individual accuracy, and models where group members revise their beliefs as a function of their mutual respect. The scope of these models covers the aggregation of propositional attitudes, probability functions, and numerical estimates. By comparing these different kinds of models and contrasting them with findings in psychology, management science, and the expert judgment literature, the chapter provides a better understanding of the role of expertise in group agency, both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective. © Oxford University Press 2018. All rights reserved.

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Martini C, Sprenger J. Opinion Aggregation and Individual Expertise. I Boyer-Kassem T, Mayo-Wilson C, Weisberg M, redaktörer, Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge: New Essays. Oxford University Press USA. 2017. s. 180-201 https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190680534.003.0009