Planning in the We-mode

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Sammanfattning

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på gästpublikationSocial Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses
RedaktörerGerhard Preyer, Georg Peter
Antal sidor24
UtgivningsortCham
FörlagSpringer International Publishing
Utgivningsdatum2017
Sidor117-140
Artikelnummer9
ISBN (tryckt)978-3-319-33235-2
ISBN (elektroniskt)978-3-319-33236-9
StatusPublicerad - 2017
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Publikationsserier

NamnStudies in the Philosophy of Sociality
FörlagSpringer
Volym8

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 611 Filosofi

Citera det här

Hakli, R. A., & Mäkelä, P. A. (2017). Planning in the We-mode. I G. Preyer, & G. Peter (Red.), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses (s. 117-140). [9] (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality; Vol. 8). Cham: Springer International Publishing .
Hakli, Raul Aleksi ; Mäkelä, Pekka Antero. / Planning in the We-mode. Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses. redaktör / Gerhard Preyer ; Georg Peter. Cham : Springer International Publishing , 2017. s. 117-140 (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality).
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abstract = "In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency.",
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Hakli, RA & Mäkelä, PA 2017, Planning in the We-mode. i G Preyer & G Peter (red), Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses., 9, Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality, vol. 8, Springer International Publishing , Cham, s. 117-140.

Planning in the We-mode. / Hakli, Raul Aleksi; Mäkelä, Pekka Antero.

Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses. red. / Gerhard Preyer; Georg Peter. Cham : Springer International Publishing , 2017. s. 117-140 9 (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality; Vol. 8).

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

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AB - In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency.

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A2 - Peter, Georg

PB - Springer International Publishing

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Hakli RA, Mäkelä PA. Planning in the We-mode. I Preyer G, Peter G, redaktörer, Social Ontology and Collective Intentionality : Critical Essays on the Philosophy of Raimo Tuomela with His Responses. Cham: Springer International Publishing . 2017. s. 117-140. 9. (Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality).