Practical Reasoning

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Sammanfattning

This chapter discusses two contemporary pictures of practical reasoning. According to the Rule-Guidance Conception, roughly, practical reasoning is a rule-guided operation of acquiring (or retaining or giving up) intentions to come to meet synchronic requirements of rationality. According to the Reasons-Responsiveness Conception, practical reasoning is, roughly, a process of responding to apparent reasons. Its standards of correctness derive from what we objectively have reason to do, if things are as we suppose them to be. I argue that a version of the latter has some significant advantages. This has some surprising consequences for how we should conceive of the structure and process of instrumental reasoning in particular.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på gästpublikationThe Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
RedaktörerDaniel Star
Antal sidor28
UtgivningsortOxford
FörlagOxford University Press
Utgivningsdatum10 jul 2018
Sidor395-422
ISBN (tryckt)9780199657889
DOI
StatusPublicerad - 10 jul 2018
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 611 Filosofi

Citera det här

Kauppinen, A. (2018). Practical Reasoning. I D. Star (Red.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity (s. 395-422). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.18
Kauppinen, Antti. / Practical Reasoning. The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. redaktör / Daniel Star. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018. s. 395-422
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Kauppinen, A 2018, Practical Reasoning. i D Star (red.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, s. 395-422. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.18

Practical Reasoning. / Kauppinen, Antti.

The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. red. / Daniel Star. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2018. s. 395-422.

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

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Kauppinen A. Practical Reasoning. I Star D, redaktör, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2018. s. 395-422 https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199657889.013.18