Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

In naturalized cognitive philosophy/psychology intention and intentionality has been defined in terms actions, which is said to make this approach a pragmatist one (see ). I suggest that we may approach desire in a dialectical, pragmatist, and naturalistic manner. I offer a detailed model of desire, which exhibits all these three features. Desire cannot be explained in terms of actions simply because desire is not essentially related to action. Instead, we can use happiness and satisfaction. Of these, happiness is a directly naturalistic term while satisfaction is an indirect one. In analytical philosophy of action these two terms are dismissed although they are essential to the pragmatist model of desire. We can call it dialectical because of a feedback loop whose purpose is to fix an emerging contradiction. Like so many dialectical conceptual moves this leads to difficult problems of (practical) rationality.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på gästpublikationPragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher
RedaktörerSami Pihlström
Antal sidor16
UtgivningsortNew York
FörlagRoutledge, Taylor & Francis Group
Utgivningsdatum2017
Utgåva1
Sidor223-238
ISBN (tryckt)978-1-138-65523-2
ISBN (elektroniskt)978-1-315-62262-0
StatusPublicerad - 2017
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Publikationsserier

NamnRoutledge Studies in American Philosophy
Volym8

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 611 Filosofi

Citera det här

Airaksinen, T. (2017). Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment. I S. Pihlström (Red.), Pragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher (1 red., s. 223-238). (Routledge Studies in American Philosophy ; Vol. 8). New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
Airaksinen, Timo. / Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment. Pragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher. redaktör / Sami Pihlström. 1. red. New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. s. 223-238 (Routledge Studies in American Philosophy ).
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Airaksinen, T 2017, Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment. i S Pihlström (red.), Pragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher. 1 uppl, Routledge Studies in American Philosophy , vol. 8, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, New York, s. 223-238.

Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment. / Airaksinen, Timo.

Pragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher. red. / Sami Pihlström. 1. red. New York : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2017. s. 223-238 (Routledge Studies in American Philosophy ; Vol. 8).

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

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Airaksinen T. Psychology of Desire and the Pragmatics of Betterment. I Pihlström S, redaktör, Pragmatism and Objectivity : Essays Sparked by the Work of Nicholas Rescher. 1 red. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. 2017. s. 223-238. (Routledge Studies in American Philosophy ).