The Philosophy of The Varieties of Goodness (1963): Essays on G. H. von Wright's Theory of Value and Moral Philosophy

This doctoral dissertation is a study of G. H. von Wright’s (1916–2003) philosophical treatise The Varieties of Goodness (1963), which has been unduly neglected in later developments of philosophical ethics and theory of value. The first, value-theoretical half of The Varieties of Goodness is a study of the conceptual varieties of goodness, or of the different ways of employing the word “good” in language. Von Wright distinguishes six basic varieties: instrumental, technical, utilitarian, medical and hedonic goodness, and the good of some being. The second half of the book contains von Wright’s (normative) moral philosophy, which consists of a series of explications of concepts familiar from traditional philosophical ethics, such as moral goodness, virtue, moral duty and justice.

The dissertation has three objectives: (i) to revisit and discuss von Wright’s basic value-theoretical ideas and proposals, (ii) to give an account of von Wright’s moral philosophy, and (iii) to relate his views to select other currents of the mid 20th century ethics. The scholarly approach is a combination of historical contextualization and (philosophical) critical reconstruction. The research utilizes unpublished archival materials and correspondence.

Introduction examines von Wrights basic philosophical proposals and sums up critically the main lines of his moral philosophy. This is done, first, by identifying and discussing a number of axiological and moral-philosophical Grundgedanken (basic ideas) and their repercussions, and second, by giving an overview of von Wright’s explicative accounts of moral notions. I suggest that von Wright’s normative moral philosophy is an early example of a welfarist position in ethics. I also argue that some of his basic ideas still provide illuminating perspectives to philosophical disputes. On the critical side, I point out that some of these ideas are open to different interpretations and that some of von Wright’s methodological presuppositions are problematic.

In the Articles, The Varieties of Goodness is approached from various angles. Article I discusses von Wright’s conception of philosophy and the analytical method that is used in charting the varieties of goodness. Article II focuses on one of the key ideas of von Wright’s moral-philosophical endeavour: the idea that moral goodness is a non-autonomous form of goodness in search of a meaning. Article III discusses the notion of the good of man (human welfare), which is a pivotal notion in von Wright’s explication of moral value. Articles IV and V are devoted to the relation between The Varieties of Goodness and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1889–1951) philosophical heritage. Article IV traces the development of von Wright’s work in the 1950s and shows how his philosophical approach is variously indebted to Wittgenstein’s late work. Article V contains a thorough criticism of James Klagge’s recent interpretation of von Wright’s and Wittgenstein’s views on the varieties of goodness.