Sammanfattning
According to moral encroachment facts about epistemic justification can vary with
moral factors that are unrelated to the truth of the belief. Most of the literature on
this topic has focused on how beliefs can wrong, and whether the data that moral
encroachers offer in support of their view can be explained within a purist frame-
work. A largely neglected question has been what kind of consequences moral
encroachment would have for epistemic justification if the thesis were true. Here I
remedy this shortcoming by examining what kind of structural implications moral
encroachment has for epistemic justification.
moral factors that are unrelated to the truth of the belief. Most of the literature on
this topic has focused on how beliefs can wrong, and whether the data that moral
encroachers offer in support of their view can be explained within a purist frame-
work. A largely neglected question has been what kind of consequences moral
encroachment would have for epistemic justification if the thesis were true. Here I
remedy this shortcoming by examining what kind of structural implications moral
encroachment has for epistemic justification.
| Originalspråk | engelska |
|---|---|
| Tidskrift | Philosophical Studies : an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition |
| Volym | 180 |
| Sidor (från-till) | 1793-1812 |
| ISSN | 0031-8116 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Publicerad - 2023 |
| MoE-publikationstyp | A1 Tidskriftsartikel-refererad |
Vetenskapsgrenar
- 611 Filosofi