Sammanfattning
May argues successfully that many claims about the causal influence of affect on moral judgment are overblown. But the findings he cites are compatible with many of the key arguments of philosophical sentimentalists. His account of rationalism, in turn, relies on an overly broad notion of inference, and leaves open crucial questions about how we reason to moral conclusions.
Originalspråk | engelska |
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Artikelnummer | 157 |
Tidskrift | Behavioral and Brain Sciences |
Volym | 42 |
Antal sidor | 3 |
ISSN | 0140-525X |
DOI | |
Status | Publicerad - 2019 |
MoE-publikationstyp | B1 Artikel i en vetenskaplig tidskrift |
Vetenskapsgrenar
- 611 Filosofi