Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists?: The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

Michiru Nagatsu; Chiara Lisciandra

doi:10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17

Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandling › Kapitel › Vetenskaplig › Peer review

Sammanfattning

The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.

Originalspråk	engelska
Titel på värdpublikation	The genealogy of self-interest in economics
Redaktörer	Susumu Egashira, Masanobu Taishido, Wade Hands, Uskali Mäki
Antal sidor	20
Utgivningsort	Singapore
Förlag	Springer
Utgivningsdatum	2021
Sidor	289-308
ISBN (tryckt)	978-981-15-9394-9, 978-981-15-9397-0
ISBN (elektroniskt)	978-981-15-9395-6
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17
Status	Publicerad - 2021
MoE-publikationstyp	A3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Vetenskapsgrenar

511 Nationalekonomi
611 Filosofi

Åtkomst av dokument

10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17

Why_is_behavioral_game_theory_economists__game__The_concept_of_beliefs_in_equilibrium_footnote_To_appear_in_Egashira__Taishido__Hands_and_M__aki__eds_Accepterat manuskript från författare, 241 KB
nagatsu_lischandra_proofKorrektur, 297 KB

Model-building across disciplinary boundaries: Economics, Ecology, and Psychology
Nagatsu, M.
01/09/2016 → 31/08/2022
Projekt: Forskningsprojekt

Citera det här

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author = "Michiru Nagatsu and Chiara Lisciandra",

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Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium. / Nagatsu, Michiru; Lisciandra, Chiara.

The genealogy of self-interest in economics. red. / Susumu Egashira; Masanobu Taishido; Wade Hands; Uskali Mäki. Singapore : Springer, 2021. s. 289-308.

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandling › Kapitel › Vetenskaplig › Peer review

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Why is Behavioral Game a Game for Economists? The concept of beliefs in equilibrium

Sammanfattning

Vetenskapsgrenar

Åtkomst av dokument

Projekt

Model-building across disciplinary boundaries: Economics, Ecology, and Psychology

Citera det här