Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game?

Michiru Nagatsu, Chiara Lisciandra

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

Sammanfattning

The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists' specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists' reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists' practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.
Originalspråkengelska
Titel på gästpublikationThe genealogy of self-interest
FörlagSpringer
Utgivningsdatum29 jan 2019
Status!!Accepted/In press - 29 jan 2019
MoE-publikationstypA3 Del av bok eller annan forskningsbok

Vetenskapsgrenar

  • 511 Nationalekonomi
  • 611 Filosofi

Citera det här

Nagatsu, M., & Lisciandra, C. (Accepterad/under tryckning). Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game? I The genealogy of self-interest Springer.
Nagatsu, Michiru ; Lisciandra, Chiara. / Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game?. The genealogy of self-interest. Springer, 2019.
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Nagatsu, M & Lisciandra, C 2019, Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game? i The genealogy of self-interest. Springer.

Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game? / Nagatsu, Michiru; Lisciandra, Chiara.

The genealogy of self-interest. Springer, 2019.

Forskningsoutput: Kapitel i bok/rapport/konferenshandlingKapitelVetenskapligPeer review

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Nagatsu M, Lisciandra C. Why is Behavioral Game Theory Economists' Game? I The genealogy of self-interest. Springer. 2019